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The Building and Maintenance of "Ethics Walls" in
Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings1
By Jeff Bush 2 and Kristal Wiitala Knutson
3
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down.4
Robert Frost
Nearly all states use "in-house" hearing officials at some level in
adjudicatory proceedings or hearings. Even a central panel may
encounter issues that require the insulation of adjudicators from
internal influences. This article addresses the need for "ethics
walls" 5 within administrative agencies and discusses an approach to
1. This article is the product of a workshop session, developed by the authors
for the 2002 National Training and Continuing Education Conference of the
National Association of Hearing Officials in Anchorage, Alaska. The workshop
primarily addressed the realities of organizational and communication issues when
administrative adjudicators are employed by the same government agency
appearing before them. This article is based on the authors' views and experiences;
it is not a comprehensive review of the subject. Deep thanks to Judge Laurence H.
Geller, formerly (now retired) Presiding Administrative Law Judge, California
Department of Social Services, for his time and suggestions in the editing of this
article.
2. Deputy Director, Alaska Public Entity Insurance, formerly Deputy
Commissioner, Alaska Department of Community and Economic Development.
3. Public Disclosure Manager, formerly Review Judge, Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services.
4. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 32-36
(Edward Connery Lathem ed., Holt 1979).
5. Commonly referred to as a "Chinese wall," the term connotes a screening
device that prohibits the exchange of confidential information between different
departments of an organization with potential conflicts of interest. The authors elect
to use the term "ethics wall," recognizing "[t]he term [Chinese wall] has an ethnic
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building and maintaining organizational safeguards to protect
administrative judges and hearing officers. Even where an
adjudicatory function is not structurally "independent" of the agency,
this article describes what the adjudicator may do to maintain his or
her integrity and impartiality in the administrative hearing.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND HEARING OFFICIALS
Due process, which ensures "a fair trial in a fair tribunal,"6 is the
fundamental requirement in administrative adjudication and its
essential purpose. 7  "Not only is a biased decision maker
constitutionally unacceptable, but 'our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness."' 8
If an administrative adjudicator works within the agency that
makes an initial administrative determination or takes adverse action
against a citizen or business, tension arises when the correctness of
the decision is reviewed within the same agency. It is natural for
differences of opinion to exist. An agency or commission performs
on many levels affecting the subjects of its regulations: it may adopt
rules, license facilities or professionals, and grant benefits or
services; it then may investigate whether a facility or person complies
with its standards and decide whether to take adverse action; and next
it notifies the affected party of its decision or enforcement action. If
the notified facility or recipient disagrees with the action, the agency
may appear through a staff representative at the hearing to support its
position. When the agency designates another agency employee as
the hearing official to decide whether the agency acted correctly, the
situation arises that is the primary organizational tension addressed in
this article. After the hearing official renders a decision, the agency
will be required to implement that result, but may be reluctant to do
so if the decision contradicts the original agency action taken.
While involvement of the administrative agency at so many
levels may raise the hackles of some, courts generally hold that this
focus which many would consider a subtle form of linguistic discrimination." Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 293 (1988). In
today's computer parlance, the concept could also be called a "firewall."
6. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
7. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-57 (1975).
8. State v. Lundgren Pac. Constr. Co., 603 P.2d 889, 896 (Alaska 1979)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
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combination of adjudicative, investigative, and prosecutorial
functions in an agency is not a violation of due process.9 Bias must
be demonstrated before a court will find a violation.' ° As the
Washington State Supreme Court stated, "[T]he mere combination of
adjudicative and investigative powers in one agency, without more,
would not be viewed by a reasonably prudent and disinterested
observer as denying any party a fair, impartial, and neutral
hearing."" 1
The difficulty in an agency adjudicator's review of the employing
agency's action is the natural human aversion to having someone else
evaluate whether one is right or wrong. The adjudicator typically
does not supervise the investigator, hearing representative, or other
agency employee who implements the decision. The adjudicator
attempts to direct agency actions through the decision, not the usual
organizational hierarchy. 12 To protect decisional independence, the
hearing official also must take the position that the agency cannot
inform the adjudicator how to decide a specific case.' 3  Agency
9. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
10. Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Dep't of
Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 99 Cal.
App. 4th 880, 885-87 (2002) (finding that paid employment of the ALJ by the state
agency party does not violate due process, because this financial interest is too
remote to require disqualification without a showing of actual bias); but see Haas v.
County of San Bernardino, 27 Cal. 4th 1017, 1032-34 (2002) (observing that an
ALJ can be disqualified without a showing of actual bias, if he or she has a strong
direct financial interest in the resolution of the case).
11. Washington State Med. Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 663 P.2d 457, 465
(Wash. 1983); see also Christopher B. McNeil, Similarities and Differences
Between Judges in the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch: The Further
Evolution of Executive Adjudications Under the Administrative Central Panel, 18 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 32-33 (1998) ("It should come as no surprise
that the agency adjudicative forum does not require a wholly independent
adjudicator. Absent any state statutory or constitutional provision giving greater
protection than the federal constitution, the independence required of agency
adjudicators under the federal constitution flows first and foremost from the due
process clause ... [which] requires only that there be a balancing of the individual's
interest in fair and accurate results against the governmental interest in efficient and
expedient decision making[.]").
12. See Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence in Administrative
Adjudication: Past, Present and Future, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 101
(1999).
13. See Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he APA creates
a comprehensive bulwark to protect ALJs from agency interference. The
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management wonders, accordingly, why it should pay for hearing
officials who will not necessarily decide cases supporting what it
views as the agency mission and goals. As a consequence, these
hearing officials not following the party line may be penalized in
many direct or indirect ways, including being unable to keep salary
parity or obtain adequate equipment, facilities, staff, and training.
A central panel system, however, is equally abhorrent to most
agency managers. With this system, the agency fears that the central
panel will lack expertise, take an anti-agency stance, and bill
excessive Costs. 14  The agency often decides to keep in-house
adjudicators as "the devil they know," maintaining at least direct
fiscal control over hearing operations. With consolidation in
government becoming the norm for cash-strapped states and
legislatures reluctant to make potentially uncontrollable fiscal
commitments, the move toward "Cadillac" hearing systems,
composed of central panels with corps of highly trained and
handsomely paid administrative law judges, is slowing. Even states
with central panels 15 opt out of the central panel for at least some
agency adjudications, often keeping executive agency adjudications
for high volume or less politically sensitive proceedings. 16
independence granted to ALJs is designed to maintain public confidence in the
essential fairness of the process through which Social Security benefits are
allocated by ensuring impartial decision making."); but see Ass'n of Admin. Law
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that "on matters
of law and policy, however, ALJs are entirely subject to the agency.").
14. Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing
Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN L.
REV. 475, 480 (2001) ("With delegation from the agency to the central hearing
office, the cost is the ability to retain control over the process by which
adjudications are carried out.").
15. At last count, twenty-five states and three cities use the central panel
system in some format. Their jurisdictions vary significantly by state. See Allen
C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later. The Progress of State Central Panels, 21 J. NAT'L
Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235, 244 (2001).
16. For example, California does not use its central panel for human services
and benefits cases, employment security or workers' compensation. See Michael
Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1992); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11
(West 2003). Washington's central panel does not have jurisdiction over workers'
compensation, motor vehicle licensing, revenue and health professional licensing.
See State of Washington, Office of Administrative Hearings, at
http://www.oah.wa.gov/AboutOAH.htm (last modified February 4, 2004). In
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The argument for central panels maintains that there is significant
risk of bias when the hearing officer is employed by the very agency
to be judged. 17 However, tension between the agency and its in-
house adjudicators is found to some degree in most agencies where
that structure exists.' 8 In a sense, this tension is positive, because it
suggests hearing officials act impartially and do not merely rubber-
stamp agency decisions. Although hearing officials act in the dual
capacity of impartial decision maker and agency employee, the
integrity of both positions can be maintained if appropriate standards
are in place. 19 As stated in the Model Code of Ethics for the National
Association of Hearing Officials:
Hearing officials should always withdraw from any
proceeding in which their impartiality becomes
compromised for any reason. However, the hearing
official should not withdraw from a proceeding if the
hearing officials' impartiality is challenged solely on
the basis that the hearing officials are employed by an
agency appearing in the proceeding. The parties may
Texas, the Department of Human Services agency hearing officers hear thousands
of public assistance and benefit matters each year. Texas Department of Human
Services, at http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/ (last modified February 13, 2002). The state
of Maryland, touted as having the broadest jurisdiction of the "Cadillac" central
panel states, still has agencies exempted from its jurisdiction. Hoberg, supra, note
15, at 236 n. 12. Alaska, South Dakota and Virginia experimented with central
panels and returned to agency adjudication or greatly scaled-down central panels.
17. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 253 (1990) (asserting "hybrid
function disables the independent exercise of each decision-maker's professional
judgment." (emphasis in original)).
18.
[I]t is speculative to state that such [central panel] AL's would
be 'more impartial' than those employed directly by a particular
agency. We will not presume that state-employed professional
AL's cannot, will not, or do not bring a constitutional level of
impartiality to the cases they hear, even if one side is the agency
that directly employs them.
Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 99 Cal. App. 4th 880, 886 (2002).
19. See Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
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agree to allow the hearing official to preside after full
disclosure has been made.20
Because adjudicators are generally paid in one way or another by the
agency appearing before them, whether as employees, as a charge
back for services, or through contract, the existence of financial ties
with that agency cannot automatically disqualify an adjudicator from
hearing an executive agency matter.2'
II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR AGENCY HEARING FUNCTIONS
The varying roles of hearing officials and other agency personnel
involved in the adjudicatory process complicate the organizational
structure of an agency. An agency must perform legislative,
executive and adjudicative functions within one governmental unit.
The agency legislates by adopting rules or policies to implement its
functions. In its executive or administrative capacity, the agency
takes an action affecting a party on the outside, whether to determine
eligibility, continue a license, or assess payment of fines, fees or
liabilities. Relief from that action can be sought by way of an
administrative hearing. The organizational structure that houses the
function where the administrative appeal is heard must ensure the
integrity and independence of the hearing process.2 2 Protections for
the hearing function vary widely by state and by agencies within each
state. The following examples describe several organizational
patterns.
A. Agency Control
This traditional model for a hearings program existed before
Goldberg v. Kelly23 and continues today in many forms. The hearing
20. NAT'L Ass'N OF HEARING OFFICIALS CODE OF ETHICS § 111(3) (1999),
available at http://www.naho.org/code-of-ethics.htm. NAHO is a national
voluntary association of hearing officials that has adopted this code as a guideline
for its members and other hearing officials. See NAT'L ASS'N OF HEARING
OFFICIALS CODE OF ETHICS § I (1999), available at
http://www.naho.org/code of-ethics.htm.
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (West 2003).
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
23. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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officer is either housed within an executive agency or program or
works directly for a governing board, carrying out a prescribed
function. Employees within the same part of the agency investigate a
matter, prosecute by appearing at the hearing, and determine whether
their peers were correct. In this model, staff and hearing officials
report to and are supervised by the same board or management
team.
24
Sometimes an employee fills multiple positions, or switches roles
with others involved in the process. Because the overlap of functions
results in conflicting duties, most agencies avoid the assignment of
different functions to one individual in the same adjudicatory
proceeding.25 For instance, some states, such as Washington, provide
for disqualification of a hearing official for conflicts under the same
principles applicable to judges in court proceedings. 26
The combination of functions and supervision of different aspects
of the process may present a quagmire of conflicts of interest for both
management and adjudicators. In short, adjudicators "should not be
subject to the authority, direction or discretion of one who has served
as investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in a proceeding before the
appeals officer or in its pre-adjudicative stage." 27
24. See Leitman v. McAusland, 934 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1991) (accepting the
use of a staff member as presiding official).
25. See, e.g., Stone & Edwards Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of
Ins., 648 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1994) (quoting Lyness v. Commonwealth, State Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs, 605 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. 1992)) (requiring the construction of
"walls of division" to reduce the "threat or appearance of bias").
26. Jackstadt v. Washington State Patrol, 976 P.2d 190, 194 (Wash. 1999).
[Washington statutes] provide "that a reviewing officer may disqualify for
any reason "for which a judge is disqualified." . . . Canon 3(D) of the
[Code of Judicial Conduct] provides that "judges should disqualify
themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to instances in which ... the judge
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party;" the judge has
"personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;" or "the judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matter in controversy."
Id. at 194-195 (citations omitted).
27. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INS.
APPEALS OFFICERS Canon I (Nat'l Ass'n of Unemployment Ins. Appellate Bds.
2002) (on file with author).
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The chief characteristic of the agency control organizational
structure is that the administrative agency or board consistently
maintains control and oversight over all these competing functions.
A common epithet used to describe programs organized in this
manner is that "the fox is guarding the henhouse." 28 However, it is
difficult to avoid such criticism under any administrative
adjudicatory system when the individuals performing these functions
all work for the government. Citizens outside of the bureaucracy
often perceive a maze of lawyers and suspect that all government
employees are in cahoots with one another. This sentiment is
particularly prevalent where the hearing official works directly within
the agency. In these cases, the agency's control structure makes
ethics walls particularly important, because no apparent
organizational barrier exists.
B. Direct Report to Agency Head
An adjudicator may report directly to the agency CEO in some
agencies, particularly in those that are small and have limited
jurisdictions. The hearing official is designated to "speak for" the
agency through its director. These hearing officials may either issue
decisions in their own name or write a proposed decision for
adoption and entry by the agency head.
Because of the myriad of functions under the agency director, this
situation works best when there are few hearings with a limited
number of programs and issues involved. Due to the pressure of
daily operations, an agency CEO may not be able to devote much
attention or time to monitoring the hearing process. This lack of
attention may actually preserve the independent functioning of the
hearing official. However, selective attention poses various
problems. Political, program, or fiscal interests of the agency may
provoke the director to become involved in particular cases of
28. McIntyre v. Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement Sys., 91 Cal.
App. 4th 730, 735 (2001). "Appellant presents no evidence that any person
involved with his application is actually biased against him. Instead, his argument
assumes that all hearing officers and staff members are biased against all applicants
because they are paid by the Board, which is itself biased against all applicants."
Id. at 735.
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perceived import to the agency or its stakeholders. 29  Given the
director's interest in the matter, the hearing official may feel
pressured to treat the case differently.
Other functions involved with hearings may be organized to fall
within a different chain of command, but still report ultimately to the
same CEO so that the agency head may feel competing demands in
any particular case. Nonetheless, it is generally recognized that
ultimately combining all functions related to administrative hearings
- investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative - in the agency head
is acceptable. 30
C. Management Function
Some agency administrators believe that hearing officials provide
a form of management to the operations of the agency through
quality and error control. These agencies, therefore, house the
hearing officials with others performing agency-wide management
functions, such as budget, audit, and human resources. The problem
that may arise with this scenario is that, while management
operations require and involve frequent decisions, decisions made
through adjudication are not of the same nature. Managers and
adjudicators have different perspectives and goals for their respective
processes.
The location of hearing functions in the agency structure may
cause strain between the conflicting values and interests of
management and adjudication. While management strives for
efficiency of operations, adjudicators are bound by rules of due
process that are seldom the most predictable and expedient way to
29. Separation of functions does not bar an agency head from participating in
an adjudicatory decision. See Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Wash.
1996).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
Congress' decision to allow an agency head to control all the functions
represents a tradeoff between the goal of minimizing the risk of potential
conflicts of interest attributable to an agency head's multiple roles and the
goal of creating an efficient decision-making structure. The Supreme
Court has consistently acquiesced in the balance Congress struck in the
APA [5 U.S.C. Section 557(b)].
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.9 (4th ed. 2002).
10 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
reach a final decision. 31  Quality improvement principles, which
guide managers to streamline business processes, do not apply to
adjudicators where such principles conflict with the protections
afforded the parties by procedural rules, case law and due process
principles. 32  Management may be driven by a desire for
predictability of outcome. However, adjudicators apply principles of
fairness to the proceeding and at times are authorized to consider
equitable standards. Their legal analysis and interpretation of a rule
or policy may not achieve the result management expected or
intended.
The fundamental management concepts of accountability and
lines of supervision may not easily co-exist with the obligation of
hearing officials to render an impartial decision. Managers are
accustomed to setting policies that employees are expected to follow
and to work to fulfill the overarching goals of the agency. The
decision reached by a hearing official may conflict with the position
advocated by agency personnel who are not supervised by the
adjudicator, or the position of the manager who supervises the
adjudicator. Adjudication appears to break the traditional chain of
command and creates a conflict between the integrity of the process
and management's belief of what is best for the agency. The
existence of ethics walls within this system can minimize the conflict
and promote both the competing interests of efficient administration
and fair treatment of customers or stakeholders.
D. Legal Division
Another model for organizational structure involves gathering
functions related to legal activities in one unit within the agency
under a legal official or director, such as an inspector general. These
functions may include rule-making, policy adoption, contracts,
advocacy, compliance, and prosecutorial duties, as well as the agency
adjudicatory functions. An unspoken reason for this structure may be
31. See, e.g., Broddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) ("The
formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings.").
32. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987).
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to isolate those individuals who are likely to frustrate the agency's
overall mission.
The ramifications of this model are similar to the above model
involving co-location with management. All legal functions may not
have the same goals or standards and may in fact be in direct conflict
with each other. Staff within these organizational structures must be
aware of potential conflicts of interest and institute safeguards. For
instance, the intent behind the drafting and adoption of a rule does
not always coincide with its interpretation by adjudicators. If hearing
representatives are also placed in the legal unit, the conflicts and need
for separation are even more apparent. Ethics walls need to be in
place to protect adjudication from other legal functions that bleed
into the same proceedings or areas of concern.
E. Central Panel or Separate Hearing Agency
This organizational structure takes hearings out of the mainstream
agency, either to a separate executive agency that conducts hearings
for multiple agencies or to an entity set up only to conduct hearings
for the particular agency or type of hearing matter. Ideally, these
agencies should be independent of the agencies appearing before
them. However, links may exist between the central panel and the
enforcement or regulatory agencies that pose similar problems
requiring the construction of ethics walls within or between the
organizations.
Funding may and usually does link the agencies. The funding for
the hearing agency may come through the source agency or be
dependent on the number or level of dispute referrals. Additionally,
the notion of customer satisfaction may influence a hearing panel. If
a program agency becomes dissatisfied with the central panel, it may
threaten to or actually withdraw its adjudications from the panel,
thereby reducing the scope of that panel's jurisdiction and its level of
funding. On an operational level, hearing representatives employed
by the agency often appear frequently before the same adjudicators,
so they are more familiar with the hearing official than the citizen or
attorney who appears only once. As a result, the administrative judge
may appear to have an established bias favoring agency personnel. 33
33. "But given the frequent contact between Halford and members of the
Board, it is only natural for them to have developed a relationship. That is precisely
12 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
In most states utilizing central panels, administrative agencies
maintain a procedure for internal review after the initial or proposed
decision by an administrative law judge. 34 The administrative agency
retains this right to the final word in order to retain control over its
programs and protect the consistency of decisions. The agency then
provides the final interpretation of its rules to guide the courts. Such
interests should not be motivating factors for independent ALJs, but
the ALJs are normally bound to apply those rules as written and not
create new law or standards. If internal agency review officers
perform the review function, there is an equal need to construct and
maintain a barrier around these additional decision makers similar to
that surrounding the hearing officials who conduct the initial hearings
for the agency.
III. COMMUNICATION ISSUES
In all the organizational structures discussed, dealings between
administrative adjudicators and agencies appearing before them raise
concerns with respect to communications among the various actors in
the process. These communications can cause actual, potential, or
apparent conflicts of interest and pose issues that must be handled
carefully to preserve the integrity of the process.
The primary concern is to determine when communications with
or by a hearing official become ex parte and thus pose risks affecting
fairness and due process to the other party or parties. 35 It is usually
easier to be sensitive to limits on communications with outside
parties, but similar restrictions must also apply within the agency.
These agency communications can be as blatantly improper as an
attempt to convince the adjudicator of the agency's position in a
pending proceeding by means of providing supporting information
not submitted during the hearing. 36 Impropriety is less clear when
the reason defendants must exercise vigilance and caution, to ensure not only
fairness, but the appearance of fairness." Quintero v. City of Santa Ana, 114 Cal.
App. 4th 810, 817 (2003).
34. See, e.g., Washington State Administrative Procedures Act, WASH. REV.
CODE § 34.05.464 (West, WESTLAW, through Chapter 1 of 2004 Regular
Session).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(I) (prohibiting ex parte communication in formal
adjudication).
36. Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278, 1286 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
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the adjudicator seeks expertise from agency staff not involved in the
specific case, soliciting background expertise in an arcane or
specialized area or requesting information about customary
interpretation of a rule or policy. 37  Adjudicators are often
empowered to take "official notice" of "technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge," 38 which could be
considered an indirect form of ex parte communication with an
agency's adjudicator but is allowable so long as the experts consulted
are not directly involved in the proceeding and the facts of the
individual case are not addressed.
Communications from the agency to the hearing official that are
permissible and do not raise the specter of ex parte issues are those
that are made publicly or to the public at large, such as by adoption
of a rule or policy or other interpretation of law. Even if a rule
amendment is designed to overturn an interpretation in a hearing
decision, these communications express the agency's policy in a
formal, established, and public manner. Similarly, if agency
adjudicators are allowed to select decisions to be granted precedential
value by other adjudicators or the agency, it would not violate ex
parte restrictions if the agency recommends selection of a particular
case, provided other parties have the same opportunity to nominate
decisions.
If not directly related to a particular matter, communications may
still have undertones affecting an adjudicator's decision-making if
they attempt to directly or indirectly control behavior through budget,
salary, facility, and staffing decisions. Threats of elimination,
substantial budget cuts, or workload increases may serve as
retaliation against adjudicators. 39  Such threats are particularly
insidious because, although the motivation behind these plans may be
suspect, in most cases it is difficult to establish that they are
37. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.455(l)(c) (West, WESTLAW,
through Chapter I of 2004 Regular Session): "Presiding officers may
communicate with other employees or consultants of the agency who have not
participated in the proceeding in any manner, and who are not engaged in any
investigative or prosecutorial functions in the same or factually related case."
38. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.05.452(5) (West, WESTLAW, through Chapter 1
of 2004 Regular Session).
39. On the other hand, an agency must also ensure that its actions do not
"create the risk that hearing officers will be rewarded with future remunerative
employment for decisions favorable to the county." Haas v. County of San
Bernadino, 27 Cal. 4th 1017, 1037 (2002).
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impermissible. These efforts will usually be presented as part of
normal agency operations, which otherwise would be appropriate
under prevailing economic conditions.
Notwithstanding the potential threat of inappropriate conduct
directed at hearing officials, an agency is still entitled to supervise the
manner and quality of the adjudicator's work. Of course, this
supervision does not extend to demanding a different legal opinion or
decision from what the adjudicator reached through competent
review of the facts and law under the principles of due process in a
particular case. 40 A supervisor cannot evaluate the adjudicator's
work on the basis of the result reached in a decision unless that
decision is unfounded in the law or not reasonably supported by the
facts. While review of decisions may be permitted by the
jurisdiction, the communication is improper if the hearing officer is
pressured to change a reasoned and well-founded decision.
Supervision and control may be exercised over the content and text
of a poorly written, unsupported or unclear decision to ensure that the
adjudicator submits a quality product that affects the rights of the
parties and can be understood and applied by them.
The final decision must be that of the official rendering it,
whether that official is the individual conducting the hearing or the
director or board member reviewing a proposed decision. If the
hearing official has authority to issue the final decision, that decision
must coincide with what the adjudicator believes to be the correct
result, and he or she must not accept a substitution of judgment by
someone who has not heard the case. If the hearing official's
decision is recommended or proposed to an ultimate decision-maker
authorized to enter the final decision, that authority may substitute
judgment and analysis for that of the presiding officer as authorized
by law or procedure, provided that the authority has reviewed the
matter and has valid reason for not deferring to the judgment of the
adjudicator hearing the case.
Hearing officials also need to be able to consult and collaborate
on interpretations of law in order to develop correct and consistent
results without violating ex parte standards. They may consult with
attorneys general, provided that their office has screening and
separation of functions within its staff to ensure that persons
providing legal counsel to the hearing official may not also advise the
40. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
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agency during the hearing. 4 1 Conversely, a hearing official may give
constructive input into policies or rules that cause problems of
interpretation or comment on the adequacy of staff work in
preparation for hearings, but must be careful to separate such
communications from any pending proceeding.
With regard to other agency staff, a hearing official need not be
completely isolated. The official may socialize and join in agency
activities so long as the prohibition of ex parte communication is
understood and followed. However, the agency employees must
avoid the appearance of impropriety. Awards, recognition, or the
assignment of cases based on the outcome of decisions would be
clearly improper, because they signal to adjudicators the "correct"
way to decide a case. To protect the in-house agency adjudicator
from improper communications, both direct and indirect, the agency
needs to build and fortify ethics walls around the adjudicator and
within the agency itself.
IV. How TO BUILD AND STRENGTHEN THE WALL
The administrative hearing process requires re-examination and
appraisal of determinations made by an administrative agency.
Regardless of the hearing official's employment or fiscal relationship
with a party agency, the hearing official should exercise
independence of action, decision, and judgment to protect the due
process rights of parties and achieve a legally correct result in a case.
The hearing official's maintenance of decisional independence from
42
agency management and programs is crucial.
The ethics wall, which protects the adjudicatory process from
agency trespass, needs to be built of several components. First, the
physical location of the adjudicators should be separate from the
program or representational parts of the agency. Different locations
should be used if possible; alternatively, structural separations can be
used.43 Surrounding staff should implement physical separation of
41. Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355, 369 (Wash. 1995); Greene v. Babbitt, 943
F. Supp. at 1286.
42. NAT'L Ass'N OF HEARING OFFICIALS CODE OF ETHICS § IV (1999),
available at http://www.naho.org/code-of-ethics.htm.
43. As stated in Quintero v. City of Santa Ana, 114 Cal. App. 4th 810, 813
(2003):
16 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
potentially conflicting functions of the agency. Second, equipment,
including fax machines, printers, copiers, file cabinets, and recycle bins,
must be secured and maintained as independently as possible. If the
agency cannot provide separate printers, copiers, and fax machines,
other measures must be implemented to promote separation. These
measures would include use of security codes that limit access to
printed documents and frequent pickup of documents from the
machine, to ensure that co-located program staff cannot view the
hearing officials' work product. Protected computer directories and
files are also essential to prevent the ability of advocates and others
from premature access to the product of the decision-maker.
Distribution lists of agency e-mail messages should not include
adjudicators if pending cases or other impermissible communications
may be included.
Organizational efforts must protect the process from intrusion by
interested parties. As addressed above, any internal organizational
structure presents challenges in building and maintaining a wall
within the agency. However, processes and safeguards must be
developed and implemented to prevent control of the hearing
official's operational matters by personnel who act as adversaries in
adjudications. Hearing officials must exercise complete control over
their deliberations and decision-making process, including receipt of
additional evidence, decision preparation and issuance, and any
reconsideration. While involvement in ministerial aspects of the
hearing process such as scheduling of hearings and selection of
hearing rooms poses less risk of impermissible interference with the
decision-making process, agencies must be careful not to exert
indirect control over the hearing official through means such as
making less favorable assignments to less favored adjudicators.
Hearing office support staff should be dedicated to the adjudicatory
functions whenever possible and not work for parts of the agency that
Preliminarily, we agree that in the context of administrative law, there is
no absolute prohibition against the city attorney's office representing both
the Board and other city agencies such as the police department. Provided
certain guidelines are met, the city attorney's office may "act[] as an
advocate for one party in a contested hearing while at the same time
serving as the legal adviser for the decision maker." (Howitt v. Superior
Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1579 [5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196].) But,
"[p]erformance of both roles ... is appropriate only if there are assurances
that the adviser for the decision maker is screened from any inappropriate
contact with the advocate." (Id. at p. 1586.)
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may appear at hearings. When seeking the advice of counsel, the
agency should ensure an ethics wall is present within the Attorney
General's office, including separate offices or sections for attorneys
advising the different functions and programs.44
The chain of command should be designed to best protect the
fairness and integrity of the hearing process within the agency, with
the role of the supervisor limited to review of competency and
productivity. 45  The supervisor must refrain from interfering with
independent judgment and may review only the quality of the
process, without influencing reasoned results. 46  Conduct and
communication protocols for interacting with hearing officials needs
44. The court in Quintero addressed the role of a city attorney who had served
both as a advocate before the board and as an advisor to the board as follows:
As noted in Howitt v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 1575, dual
representation is not barred so long as there is an adequate separation of
the two roles and the attorneys performing them. (Id. at pp. 1586-87.)
What is inappropriate is one person simultaneously performing both
functions. That is not to say that once a city attorney has appeared in an
advisory role, he or she cannot subsequently act as a prosecutor, or vice
versa. But the attorney may occupy only one position at a time and must
not switch roles from one meeting to the next.
114 Cal. App. 4th at 817.
45. For discussions on the permissible limitations of evaluations of the
performance of administrative law judges and other hearing officials, see, e.g.,
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Administrative Adjudication Total Quality Management, 15 J.
NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1995); Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of
Administrative Law Judges; Premises, Means and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 1 (1997); Robert Robins Gales, The Peer Review Process in
Administrative Adjudication, 21 -1 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 56 (2001).
46. Influencing the results of decisions through these indirect means to achieve
the result the agency desires may be tantamount to rule-making without meeting
formal statutory requirements:
To the extent that administrative agencies jealously guard their ability to
control the work of administrative law judges through supervision,
discipline, and evaluation of their work product in order to reach
unpublished agency goals or to enact unpublished agency policy, those
agencies engage in rule-making in the shadows, hiding from other
participants in the process in what manner they intend to interpret and
enforce the published law.
R. Terrence Harders, Striking a Balance: Administrative Law Judge
Independence and Accountability, 19 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 7-8
(1999).
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to be established and enforced at all levels of the agency. The
structure should grant the adjudicator functional decisional
independence, insulated from both agency and political influence.
Employment protections such as the civil service system that guard
against arbitrary or retaliatory dismissals or require "good cause" for
adverse personnel action promote the security of the position for a
hearing official and guard against the threat of retaliation for
unfavorable decisions. 47
Comprehensive training is also essential to ensure the continued
protection of the hearing process. Agency staff, boards, and directors
must learn, according to their respective positions, what is
permissible communication and interaction with the adjudicatory
staff. New staff must be trained and current staff will need periodic
refresher courses. The agency needs to instruct staff regarding the
prohibition of ex parte communication and provide specific examples
of situations to be avoided. Hearing officials must receive sufficient
training in procedure, ethics, and substantive law to conduct fair
proceedings, to resist ex parte communications, and to render sound,
legally correct decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
'And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential. ,48
No matter how strong and thick the walls are, the crucial player
in this process is the hearing official.
[O]ur real control over the process is what comes from
within each of us: our integrity. Independence of the
judge and hearing official must exist. It can exist as
long as the mandates of the hearing authority affect
form, not substance, and requirements are imposed for
quality, not results. The hearing authority does have a
role to provide a framework to ensure that the process
47. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 99 Cal. App. 4th 880, 886 (2002).
48. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
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is, and appears to be, fair, impartial and independent.49
Hearing officials must be constantly aware of the tensions that
result from their position in the agency structure. They must
faithfully apply due process principles, avoiding even the appearance
of impropriety. Regardless of where they are located within the
government organizational structure, hearing officials must be
impartial and conduct the proceedings with integrity. Ultimately, it is
the responsibility of the adjudicators to ensure that the agency
monitors and preserves the ethics walls it has built.
49. Judge Laurence H. Geller, Integrity - The Heart and Soul of Administrative
Adjudication, NAHO NEWS Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Nat'l Ass'n of Hearing Officials,
Sacramento, Cal.) March 1999, at 1 (on file with author).

